

1775
A N
E N G L I S H M A N ' S A N S W E R
T O A
English
German Nobleman.



C O N T A I N I N G S O M E
O B S E R V A T I O N S
U P O N T H E
P O L I T I C A L S Y S T E M
O f t h e p r e s e n t
A D M I N I S T R A T I O N ,

As it is exposed in the G E R M A N ' s Letter.


— *Desunt. Qui liberè dicat, qui cum fide defendat, id quod in hac causa est satis, non deest, profectò.*
Cic.



L O N D O N :

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P.



A N
ENGLISHMAN'S ANSWER
T O A
GERMAN NOBLEMAN.

GNADIGER HERR,

I SEE with Pleasure, by your Letter, that you have at last avowed, in writing, the Character in which you have for some Time acted, that of a *German Nobleman*. And indeed you have so well acted your Part in this Piece, that some Persons are really deceived into the Opinion of your being the very Thing you represent. A *Swiss* Reader urged, that at least it was evident you were not an *Englishman*; because, said he, though the Author *throws about foul Names*, he does not do it *with a good Grace*; which I perceive, by the Letter || itself, is one of the Characteristicks whereby an *Englishman* is to be known. You mistake, said I; *The throwing about foul Names with a good Grace* is not given us as the

Mark of an *Englishman*, but of a *thorough Englishman*. *Englishmen* are *brave and bountiful, penetrating and judicious* * ; and these consequently will never throw about foul Names, either with a good or a bad Grace. Very true, said he, but then you must remember, that these same *Englishmen*, who are so *penetrating and judicious*, have at the same Time their Minds infected with Prejudices which make them *see all Things in false Lights* †. So that this latter Part of their Character disposes them to throw about foul Names, as the former Part makes them do it with a good Grace. And I cannot therefore perceive any Ground for your Distinction between an *Englishman* and a *thorough Englishman*. But supposing such a Distinction to be just, I conclude, from what I have said, that the Author is neither the one nor the other. I frankly owned the Cogency of his Argument, and I farther allowed, that the Author possessed many Qualities of a *German*, (as he pretends to be) and

* Pag. 31.

† Pag. 44.

among others, that observed by *Tacitus*, *de pace denique ac bello plerumque in conviviiis consultant*. It must be owned he does, as *Tacitus* observes of them, *deliberate when he cannot feign*. But then he does not, as they did, *wait to determine till he cannot err*. But, GNADIGER HERR, you might well indeed hope to be mistaken for a *German*, or any thing, rather than an *Englishman*, by the lavish Abuse you go out of your Way to throw upon one of the best and greatest Men *England* can boast of; a Man of superior Talents and exalted Sentiments; unambitious of any Honour but that of serving his Country. He opposed the Administration, because his Duty to his Country obliged him to do it; and he was at the Head of the Opposition, because he opposed. The Post of *Chief of a Party*, which to another has since proved so profitable, he despised, because he detested all Party. He abhorred the Artifices, and lamented the Success, with which Party Distinctions have been fomented and preserved. That the honest Part of

the Opposition followed him was owing, to his being always in the Interest of his Country ; and that he placed his Friendships amongst them was owing to his Love of Virtue. He thought Virtue so amiable, that he was with Difficulty persuaded, that any Man of a tolerable Degree of Understanding could be an Enemy to it. Thus he thought, and this produced in him a Candor, which those he opposed, on some Occasions, took Advantage of. If he had particular and personal Objections to some of the Ministers, they were owing to his seeing them avowed Protectors, and Promoters of every Vice, that can undo a Nation, or dissolve Society. And those Ministers who preserved a Decency, in Respect of Virtue, he carefully distinguished. He valued Power only as it enabled a Man, to advance the Good of his Country, and the Happiness of Mankind. And he esteemed the patronising good Men, and the discouraging bad, the greatest Pleasure (next to supporting the Constitution of his Country)

Country) that a due Degree of Power could give him. The sole Direction of all Affairs (which he saw usurpt by the Leader of the Court Party, in the House of C——s,) he used no Arts to attain; he was so far from aspiring to it, that he could not bear being suspected of the Ambition. As ready to withstand even those who honoured him most, when he thought them in the wrong, as he was to oppose the mischievous Measures of the Administration. He was heard in Debates with the most respectful Attention. He whom you term the *Chief of a Party* debated every Subject with the Dignity of a Patriot, a Guardian of his Country's Interests, sometimes to the shaming a Prime Minister when sinking into the Leader of a Faction. Far from wishing the Ministry he opposed to err, he pointed out to them the right Way. When he had done this, satisfied within himself, he formed no Faction in those who joined with him in *opposing*. The Words *Whig* and *Tory*, often employed to injure him, by those who had nothing

thing better to support their Title to be Chiefs of the Opposition, than empty Names, and antiquated Distinctions, were never employed by him, to mark, or to reproach any Man. Amiable and engaging in his private Character, he needed no Artifice to create Friends. In public Life always aiming at public Good, he wanted no Faction to support him. Indifferent as to the Leader, in parliamentary Proceedings, his only Concern was about the Way and the End. He himself the real Strength of his Country, rejoiced to see others persist in her Cause, tho' they did it from the mere Vanity of acting the Leaders; and with the Modesty of a Follower he performed those essential Parts of a Leader which they neglected. But when they presumed upon this Modesty, and thought to draw him after them into Measures incompatible with what he had always in View, *the Establishment of the Government on the Union and Love of the People*, he exerted his truly Patriot Zeal as independently of these Leaders,

as of those who possessed the Power at which they aimed. They betrayed him, and have since, by the irreparable Loss of him, been enabled to betray their Country. Such was the Man you attempt to defame, and to defame unknown; for that you were utterly a Stranger to him, you needed to have given no stronger a Proof, than the Attempt it self. Sir *W. W.* needs no Apology, and wants no other Panegyric, than the History of his Country since it lost him. You cannot *disturb the Asbes of him*, whom no *Englishman* can sufficiently praise.

His saltem accumulem donis & fungar inani

Munere——

As I doubt your Assertion in your Title Page, I give no Credit to you, when in the Book itself you personate a Friend to the Queen of *Hungary*. Should your Actions prove you a true *German*, and I much fear they will never prove you a true *Englishman*, yet I think I can prove that you are no *Austrian*. This I think you yourself

self must own, when I have examined the little Matter contained in your Work. The Subject has been so fully treated already, that to throw your Letter into Method would shew all the World, that full Answers to your Arguments were printed before you set Pen to Paper. I shall therefore follow you in your Ramble, and see what Advantage you gain by the Disorder you perhaps only affect, but we are all subject to, when *dicimus uvidi cum sol oceano subest*. The first 29 Pages of your Letter are employed to demonstrate a Doctrine, you are prudently desirous to inculcate, *that the broad bottom Phalanx will never be able to push itself into the Administration* *. I shall not embarrass you by asking, what then was it pushed you into it? I have lived too long in Germany to shorten Controversies so much. Neither shall I observe upon your conclusive Reasoning in pag. 12, where you say, that *King William having been used to Parties in Holland, was inclined to rule by them in England, and THERE-*

FORE *tried to govern by a Ministry compounded of ALL PARTIES.* This you condemn, and yet you conclude, *this Reign might have established Union;* by keeping up party Divisions I suppose; a Method of uniting you have hitherto pretty successfully followed. I must also pass over P. 6, where I wish you had explained yourself sufficiently; when enumerating the Effects of *English* Love of Liberty, you form a Climax, and end it thus, *it frequently dictates their last Wills.* I hope you speak it in Praise, for surely there cannot be a more noble Motive, even to the most solemn and last Act of an *English* Life. At that Time it is allowed the Heart speaks; and he who, like a *Roman* under the Emperors, is a Slave in his last Will, ought to have the Word inscribed upon his Tomb by way of Epitaph. I wish too I could understand, how a Ministry founded on a *broad Bottom*, stands on no *Bottom at all*; that I might a little reconcile it to your Endeavours to *widen* your own narrow Bottom, lest it should become

indeed *no Bottom at all*. Some imagine this will soon be the Case: For they say, that while you thought to cream a certain Corps, you only took the Scum.

But, to return from smaller Observations to the Proposition you want to establish, in Order to quiet the Doubts of your foreign Friends, about your Power; I cannot but think, you have taken a wrong Method. The Pains you are at through so many Pages, produces a contrary Effect: Have you acquired, what you would persuade us you possess? Demonstrate it by your Conduct: Leave your Arguments; nay leave your Abuse of a Body of Men, now that they no longer obstruct your Advancement, whom it is allowed you very wisely traduced, whilst they resisted your Authority: And if a better disciplined Corps be under your Command, neglect those you would give us so mean an Opinion of, even at the time they engross your whole Attention. Forget the *Whig, Tory, Jacobite, Republican Clubs*, through all
which

which you say you have passed, and, having obtained the End of all your Travels, enjoy the *Liberty* of a *Premier Ministre*, which certainly must be nearly allied to that of a King, of which you give us so noble and adequate a Definition in *pag. 8*, when you tell us, that *Arbitrary Power* is the *Liberty of Princes*. You require Actions to prove the present *Emperor's German Heart* *, Give us the like Proof of your *Austrian Heart*. You know, the Condition to which the Queen of *Hungary* is reduced; *Bobemia* evacuated, indeed, but plundered, and the *French Army* so posted, that the Spring may send them where they may most annoy the House of *Austria*, or wherever the *French Interest* directs, unless a new Exportation of *English Troops* into *Flanders* stop them more effectually than the last stopped *Maillebois*. *Italy* in a State not so fit for me to describe, as for you to consider. I fear an Equivalent for *Italy*, however *just*, and however *wise*, will not be so *practicable*. The Queen of *Hungary* has paid the King

of *Prussia* the Price of his Neutrality, and perhaps you have guaranteed his Possession; but have you conquered an Equivalent for her? No, you have only *promised* it. For this your Expression, P. 36, and 42, however affectedly dark, imports, even tho' it were not explained by the projected March of the Troops from *Flanders*. Perhaps you intend to conquer at one and the same Time an Equivalent for her, and another for the Emperor, when he shall be brought to part with *French* Protection. *This indeed is a glorious Prospect, this is a safe, a just, a wise, and a very practicable Plan!* *

I can scarce pass over P. 32, without adding a few Touches to the imperfect Picture there given us; the Spirit of the whole Performance, the impartial Enquiries into private Characters, the judicious promised List of Men's *Fortunes*, the true Assertion, that such a List was once published, the candid Treatment of some of the greatest and best Characters, seem to call loudly for a due Return of Panegyric. But

* Lett. Pag. 43.

I shall

I shall leave that to History, and to the already so successful *Poets Laureat* of the present Administration, and proceed.

You begin your Vindication with telling us, that the Opposition having resolved to persist, notwithstanding the Change of the Names of the Administration, it became requisite they should form new Pretences, since the *old could no longer serve*. In Candor I must confess, you mean, they could not serve in foreign Affairs. For you know, they serve but too well still in home Affairs, and are too likely to serve in these longer than you care for ; though when they serve no longer, perhaps even some Ministers may serve no longer neither: However, the old Pretence was, it seems, *too great a Neglect of the House of Austria*, by the *English Ministry*. So the Opposition then professed, or pretended a great Regard for the House of *Austria*. And what is the new Pretence ? Why, truly, it comes out, after a good deal of mumbling, to be, *The Obstinacy of our Queen of Hungary* ;
 3 which

which put it into the Power of the present *British* Ministry, to make a very bad Bargain for her. Does not this Complaint proceed from the same just Regard to her *Hungarian* Majesty's true Interest? It manifestly does. How then have the Opposition changed their Objection! They object to a disadvantageous Measure; but perhaps you mean, they did not object to it before it was taken: And they do it now only for the Sake of opposing. What is done then by those who *support*? Do not the Advocates of the Minister, commonly called the late Minister, avow the same Pretence, when they assure us, that the Queen of *Hungary*'s Obstinacy *alone* hindered them from obtaining a Peace for her with *Prussia* for half *Silesia*? And has not that Peace cost her since, *all*, or the best Part of that Country? But it is said, she was never promised Assistance by the *British* Ministry, on *the Score of* her Difference with *Prussia*. The Conduct here avowed, nay advanced, as if it were a Matter so far from

from needing a Vindication itself, that it is sufficient to justify another, at best a disputable Part of the Conduct of the Ministry, cannot relate to the former Directors of our foreign Affairs. It is well known, that they had entertained a Plan for stripping the King of *Prussia* of all his Dominions. And this, though impracticable and wild, was, at least, consistent with the Rights of the Queen of *Hungary*, and the Engagements of *England*. The *obstinate* Perseverance of the Projectors of it, was indeed of no small Detriment to the Queen of *Hungary*; but that Detriment she the less regarded, as we still acted, as far as we did act, upon the Principle of preserving all her Dominions in her Possession, according to the Direction of the *Pragmatick Sanction*. In this Conjunction, the new Part of the Ministry entered into all the Power they now enjoy: They could not therefore content themselves with not assisting the Queen of *Hungary* against *Prussia*; they must have expressly distinguished him from the rest of her Enemies, and told her

her Majesty, That they did not mean to support the *Pragmatick Sanction*, or to preserve the present Power of the House of *Austria*, as a Balance to *France*: These were only Declarations thrown out to amuse the Vulgar; their real View was to reform the whole System of *Europe*, to parcel out her Majesty's Dominions, according to their own Judgment; and, perhaps, if Things went according to their Wish, to conquer other Dominions, more proper for her, than the richest Provinces the late Emperor had left her. Now this Doctrine is diametrically opposite to the Engagements of *England*. It is absurd in an *English* Minister, or an *Austrian*; and it is inconsistent with the Principles of the new Ministry, as they have been till now understood; nay, with the Interest of *England*, as it is generally understood, and as it induced the Crown to guarantee the *Pragmatick Sanction*. If the Power of the House of *Austria* is a necessary Balance to *France*, that Power is as much weakened by the Acquisitions

acquisitions of *Prussia*, as of the present
 Emperor. And it was understood to be
 so. Else how came *Prussia* to be in the
French Interest while she made War,
 but in the opposite Interest, when she
 obtained by a Treaty the very Thing
 for which she made War? If the Inte-
 rests of *Europe* require *England* to ex-
 ert itself in Support of the *Pragmatick*
Sanction, I should be glad to learn by
 what Art of Reasoning the King of
Prussia's Acquisitions are distinguished
 out of it; or to be informed, wherein
 consists the material Difference between
 the *French* Attempt to strip the Queen
 of *Hungary* of one Part of her Domi-
 nions, and our Ministers stripping her
 of another Part: If there be any o-
 ther Difference, than that *France*
attempts in Favour of the present
 Emperor, and we *perpetrate* in Fa-
 vour of the King of *Prussia*. For it
 cannot be urged, that what shall be gain-
 ed by her making War, will be gained
 to a Prince in her Interest; whereas what
 our Ministers Gain will fall into the
 Hands of a Prince entirely in---his own
 D Interest.

Inerest. The Argument, that the Power of the House of *Austria* must be preserved, as a necessary Balance against *France*, is equally conclusive against both. And the Principle, *on the Score* of which *England* engages so deep in the Cause of her *Hungarian* Majesty, is equally repugnant to both. If it should be said, that the Difference between the Proceeding of *France* and of the present Ministry consists in this, That *France* proposes to conquer no Equivalent for what she shall wrest from the Queen of *Hungary*, but that our Ministry does: I shall only reply, That a Man deserves to be laughed at, who in the same Breath tells us, that *France*, with all it's exorbitant Power, from which *all Europe* is in Danger, hath not been able to conquer what she engaged to obtain for the present Emperor; but that the Strength of *England* (for the *Dutch* will never come in—to this) can conquer what has been declared to be expected (if it has not been stipulated) and therefore is a Condition of the Treaty she has made

made for the King of *Prussia*. But should the Distinction between the Views of *England* and *France* be allowed to constitute a real, an important Difference; let it become the Object of Consideration, amuse the World no longer with the *Pragmatick Sanction*; for it cannot be denied, that with Regard to it, the King of *Prussia* has as little Ground for his Demands, as the present Emperor can possibly have for his.

Herethen I am sure is a *new Pretence* setup by the Person, who we are assured is *accountable for our foreign Affairs*. Can we assist the Queen of *Hungary* on any *Score*, but to guarantee the *Pragmatick Sanction*? And is not the King of *Prussia*'s Claim as repugnant to that, as the Emperor's can be? A District or two might have been a necessary Sacrifice to engage him in her Cause: But if we have procured him a whole Province, in contradiction to the End we propose by assisting her; if we have cajoled her into a Breach of the Law we guaranteed,

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teed,

teed, by the Promise of an Equivalent, I hope it will be answered to a Nation, surely little in a Condition at this time, and after such an Administration as is just gone behind the Scenes; I say, too little in a Condition to play the *Don Quixote*..

When did the Opposition argue, *that the Queen of Hungary, by yielding to our Applications in the Treaty with Prussia, had forfeited all Title under the Pragmatick Sanction*?* But who is the Man dare argue, that the State of the Question is not altered by it? We no longer vindicate the sacred Rule we guaranteed, it is broke through; the Cause of the War therefore is changed, and we now make War to conquer *France*, or to hinder Terms being given to the Emperor, who has as just a Claim to them at least as *Prussia*; or we make it to conquer an Equivalent, which her *Hungarian* Majesty had no Right to before this Treaty, for what we have wrested from her by it, in notorious Breach of the only Treaty whereby she had a Right to our Assistance.

stance. I do not mean, that we ought not to have assisted her, even had the Guarantee never been granted; it was our Interest to grant it, because it was our Interest, as *Englishmen*, to support her Family in it's Power; and it is happy we guaranteed her Succession, because it enabled us to act as Allies, not as Principals, in the War. In which of these Characters must we now act, after this prudent Discovery, of an Equivalent to be conquered for what is yielded to *Prussia*? Are we not Principals in this War? If we are not, who is? The Queen of *Hungary* is too well advised not to disclaim her being Principal. She was, indeed, Principal, and I wish we had been Allies, while the *Pragmatic Sanction* subsisted. But the Glory of this new War, like the Burthen of it, and the Honour of so notable a Negotiation, will be solely his, who is as accountable, as the last Ministry, and, I fear, not more so.

The sending over *English* Troops into *Flanders*, it is said, met with *universal Approbation*. Assisting the Queen
of

of *Hungary* very certainly did ; and the sending *abroad* Troops, whilst it was said, the demanded Men, was liked, because they could no longer be supported at home ; but the Measure of sending them to *Flanders*, first, *in order to bring in the Dutch*, next, *to make a Diversion of the Forces of France*, and lastly, *to attack Maillebois*, while the *Hessians* and *Hanoverians* hemmed him in, on the *German* Side, and I remember no other Inducements to this Measure, avowed last Spring, was created, as soon as published, with all the Ridicule, the Event has shewn it deserved. How little it was the Fault of our Minister, that this Measure was not prosecuted vigorously ||, I know not. But this Excuse does so little Justice to his Penetration, that I am inclined to think, the Measure produced all the Effect he intended by it. For the Conquest of *France* was, I am positive, not even in his Idea then ; and the Conquest of *Lorrain*, wise as it is, seeing the *Hanoverians* may act there, was not quite so practicable, till the

March of *Maillebois* into *Germany* gave them leave to join the *English* Troops in *Flanders*.

The next Objection to the Opposition is, that, notwithstanding their Zeal for the Liberty of *Europe*, just before the Session of Parliament, they procured Instructions to the Members of it, to prevent the Ministry from acting at all, by exhorting them to refuse Supplies *, (unless the Liberties of their own Country were first secured.) A most amazing Step, no doubt! *A sudden Turn concerted with the Creatures of France* †! A surprising Doctrine, never heard of in *Russia*, I dare say! That Charity begins at Home. An Army of Slaves fighting for the Liberties of *Europe*, might perhaps make a Minister merry. But to be serious, and the Subject deserves it. Are we to sacrifice the long preserved, the dear bought Liberty of *England*, to conquer *Equivalents* for *German* Princes? Surely there is as little Modesty as there is Sense in this Objection. But it has a farther Meaning than I have yet touched, and that

* P. 38.

† P. 39.

too

too such an one, as cannot be opened too fully, nor impressed too strongly on every *English* Mind. It imports, that the Ministry were determined to deny the Condition on which the Supplies were made to depend, by the Instructions to Members of Parliament. It imports this, or it imports nothing. The Condition was an effectual *Place-Bill*. What! is a Measure to be embraced, to impose on a Nation, to divert its Attention from an important, nay an essential Object, in order to veil the Shame of one Man, of one mean Deserter? And is that same Measure to be denied, at any Risk, to the repeated Desires, to the just Security of a whole Nation? If it be so, the Minister may boast of Ministerial and Royal Liberty, perhaps; but there is an End of Constitutional, Parliamentary, National Liberty, in this Country.

The other Condition was, that a Man so notoriously guilty, as to barter his very Power, for a Screen, should stand his Trial; not that he should be removed without one, as was once proposed;

posed; I hope by none who refused afterwards to let him even be tried. That the meanest Robber, who steals a Sheep, should stand his Trial, is essential to all Government. Men submit to Government, to secure their Property. When a Trial is denied, whether it be of a common Felon, or a Minister, the Government is in the same Situation. *Dum civitas erit, judicia fient.* A Gang may rescue the one, a Faction may screen the other; but it is Impudence in the one, to call itself the *Posse Comitatus*, so is it in the other to call itself the Nation. Faction, under the Mask of Party, may sometimes withhold a publick Criminal from Punishment; but it is Faction, in it's broadest Face, that screens any suspected Minister from a Trial. What then does the Dispute amount to? A Nation, with it's loudest Voice, calls a single Man to his Trial, a Treasurer to Account. Does the Safety of *Europe* depend upon the Impunity of a Man, who has betrayed his native Country? Or is the Liberty of *Great-Britain* the propitiatory Sa-

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crifice to be offered for the Liberty of *Europe*? Must a Parliament be denied a Fundamental, the essential Fundamental of it's Constitution, lest one Man fail of Power for screening another? And must a Nation be divided, and in the most dangerous Conjunction torn with Animosities, that the Conduct of one of it's Servants may not be exposed to that Light it cannot bear? This is a fair and a true State of the Case; and from this let every Man judge of those *Englishmen*, who demanded such a Condition, and bestow the proper Appellation on those who refused it, nay, who avow their Refusal; though I am a *thorough Englishman*, I decline the Task. But let every *Englishman*, nay every Freeman, join with me in lamenting the Loss, that put it into the Power of such Men, to treat this Nation in this Manner.

The most extravagant Thing of all, that the Opposition have done, is, we are next told, entertaining this wildest and most unfounded Fiction; that

*all the present Measures are dictated in Favour of Hanover**. We are told, if we would but *consider the Value of his Britannick Majesty's three Kingdoms, in Comparison of his Electorate*, we should conclude, what? that Measures, so dictated, are wrong: No, that such Measures are not pursued: Very logical truly! You only assume, that the present Ministry cannot pursue wrong Measures; and that is a trifling Postulatum: By the like Reasoning, and what follows, I will undertake to vindicate any Ministry, even that which the Hero of this Letter opposed. But the Author is sensible of this, and therefore wisely enters into a full Discussion upon this Head. He says, *Hanover* formerly pursued *British* Measures, by which it endangered itself, *and put itself to an immense Expence* †. But what did the then *British* Ministry do, upon the Occasion? *They left it to get out of the Plunge as it could*. Abominable, monstrous! Did they in Truth? And after they had helped it into the Plunge too! There cannot therefore

* P. 43.

† P. 45.

possibly be a better Thing done, than for the Successor of that abominable Minister, to make good to *Hanover*, that *immense Expence*, to prevent the like *Danger* in Time to come; and to acquire Credit, at the Cost of his routed Predecessor. But notwithstanding all this, it is confessed, the new Negotiations begun by sending a great Minister into *Holland*, to negotiate an Alliance in the Name of *Hanover*, do indeed give some *Shew of Reason* to this *wild and unfounded Fiction* † of the Opposition. Hold, that is only to *vulgar Minds*; Minds formed for political Science, and Statesmen's *Finesses*, see it in a quite different Light. They see, That *it was requisite for an Ambassador* of the Crown of Great Britain, to use some other Title (in his very first Audience) than that of the Crown of Great Britain, to form an Alliance proper for the Preservation of Germanick Liberty. Why? For the Sake of keeping the British Nation from being Principals in this, as in the last War. So Eng-
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land preserves it's Rank you see, it remains the Lion, and little *Hanover* becomes the Jackall, that hunts before him. See what it is to be Master of foreign Treaties, and of the Skill of Negotiation ; this little Slight imposes, —on whom? The *French*. No, they knew that the Earl of *Stair* was the *British* Embassador, and the *British* General, appointed to command 16000 Men in *Flanders*. Whether *England* were Principal or Second, *France* was equally concerned, with relation to it, and provided accordingly against it. On whom then did we impose? The *Dutch*? We were indeed offering to treat with them, and perhaps expected they too might demand some *Equivalent* from *England*, which they could not in Conscience require from *Hanover*: But did we impose upon them? No, we did not attempt it; the Memorials of the *British* Embassador prove it. Did we then impose upon ourselves? No, not even that. This doughty Argument never appeared, till it shewed itself in a Pamphlet, called,
Obser-

Observations on the Conduct of Great-Britain, in Respect to Foreign Affairs; and then was so far from imposing upon any body, that it was thought undeserving of any Notice. But GNA-DIGER HERR, are you in earnest when you tell this silly Story? You say, and you fall into a Passion when you say it, that it has been insinuated, that the *Dutch* took Offence at it. In truth, I believe they did not; if the Trick was tried upon them, I believe they only laughed at it: I know the *Dutch*, I have lived in their Country, and am persuaded the noble Earl, who has served there, could never have been brought to use this profound Fetch to them with a grave Face. But, if he had, how would it prevent *England's* being Principal in this War, as in the last? Compare the Expence of the highest Year of the last War, with the Estimates of the present Year, and inform the World how far we are now from being Principals of the same kind. In assisting the Queen of *Hungary* to support the *Pragmatick Sanction*, *Eng-*
land

land could never be Principal any more than *Holland*. To make War on any other Principle, was and is neither the Interest of *England*, or of *Holland*. To solicit the *Dutch* to join us, if the *French* attacked *Flanders*, was soliciting them to preserve their own Dykes; or like soliciting a Minister to consult his own Interest. They understand their own Interest so well, that they have never failed soliciting *England*, on every just Apprehension of that kind. What End then could this State-Craft serve? Did you imagine, the *Dutch* would enter into a wild, unfounded Project of conquering *France*, in order to re-adjust the Balance of Power in *Europe*? In this, indeed, *England* must be Principal, for I will engage there is not, in all *Europe* besides, one Ministry wild enough to entertain such a Scheme. I suspect this however to be the Meaning of that beautiful, pathetic and metaphorical Peroration, *that if we once lose that which makes us the Beam, we shall soon discern of how little Weight we are,*

are, when thrown in with other States into the Scale of Power. I say I suspect it, because I really only suspect this Passage to have any Meaning at all. But surely you are by this Time convinced, how utterly unable this over-burthened Nation is, to pay for *all the Iron* you imagine you shall muster against *France*. To support the Queen of *Hungary*, by carrying on the War in *Germany*, in Concurrence with her other Allies, requires our last Efforts; if you have as yet formed any *Treasury Notions*, you must know this to be true. In *Germany* we are sure the utmost Efforts will be used by *her Majesty* likewise, and the Burthen not left upon her Allies, as it was by the Emperor, during the last War in *Flanders*, and by *Spain*, in the Wars that preceded the last in the same Country. In *Germany*, *France* carries on a foreign War, as well as we do, and there, is subject to all the same Disadvantages, and perhaps to some more. But should you change the Scene, as I doubt you have already changed

changed the Principle of the War, we shall then labour under all the Inconveniencies, that have already brought us so low, and *France* will reap at last all the Advantages she ever did from the Dissolution of a wearied, weak, and discordant Confederacy.

Though this Consequence be evident, I am not a little given to think, that this Confederacy is intended to be insinuated, where you say, that *the present System of supporting the House of Austria, restoring the Balance of Power, and giving a Check to the Influence of France, has been clearly and explicitly laid down in the King's Speeches* *. If you mean the two last Parts of this System, as Consequences of the first, every Man in *England* will, I dare say, agree to it: But if you mean them as independent Branches of the present System, I hope even the Majority of P——t will refuse their Concurrence. The Dispute has hitherto been concerning the most proper Means of supporting the Queen of *Hungary*; where I think there can

be no doubt of deciding in Favour of those Means, that, if effectual, are least expensive to this Nation. But should the other two Branches come into Dispute, I fear our Weakness would decide it more fatally, than ever I hope to see it, determined. And I much fear this Opinion is concerted with better Supporters, *than the Creatures of France*, whatever you may wish to have believed. You see how necessary it is to find out some new Palliative for the *Hanoverian* Negotiation at the *Hague*, or to own freely, that it was intended to assure the *Dutch*, that *Hanover* would at last really permit us to act, notwithstanding the Neutrality.

In Page 51 you mention *Negotiations with which the Opposition affect to be displeased, which yet in some other Conjunction they would have pointed out*. I have heard of no successful Negotiations, but that with *Prussia*, with which your Letter gives me more Reasons to be displeased, than I ever heard from any other Person, and than
 most

most others, I believe, suspected. And if it be founded upon *England's* conquering for the Queen of *Hungary* an Equivalent, in lieu of *Silesia*, I will be bold to affirm, there is not an honest Man in *England*, but must think it the most pernicious Treaty that ever was made, even by an *English* Administration.

The Negotiation at *Naples* is indeed another too successful one; what you say to vindicate it, amounts only to this, *That the Court of Vienna relished it well* *. It was well relished there indeed; you add, *it has had happy Consequences in Italy, and in Germany*. Alas, the Consequences of this Negotiation are but too apparent: You conclude however, with this truly Ministerial Hint, *and perhaps in Spain*. By this and the Context you would insinuate, that Commodore *Martin* went to *Naples* to negotiate a Change of the Ministry in *Spain*, as well as *to put his Neapolitan Majesty in Mind of his true Interest* †: This looks very like the un-

* P. 56.

† P. 55.

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happy Squadron sent formerly to the *Bastimentos* to persuade the *Spaniards* to deliver up their Wealth; but if by Means of this Naval Memory Master, the *Spaniards* are at the *Eve of a grand Revolution*; might they not have been brought before now to the Festival itself, had the Commodore's Instructions been dictated by the Interest of *Great-Britain*? I hope there was no Need of this Embassador likewise playing the *Hanoverian*. But you wind up the whole of your cogent Vindication of this Measure, with assuring us, *that nothing has conduced more, to shew his Catholic Majesty that Great-Britain can baffle his Designs in all Quarters of the World.* Nothing we have done you mean. But, suppose we had sent Home to *Madrid*, the Son we so wisely introduced into *Italy*, would it not have convinced his Catholic Majesty as powerfully? I am sure it would have *baffled his Designs* in one Quarter of the World, more effectually than, in my poor Opinion, we have yet done in any.

How cunningly Somebody or other has been baffled by this Method of putting Princes *in Mind of their Interest*, I dare say you will hear more of than I have leisure to write. I have taken no Notice of what you advance, to prove that the House of *Austria* did not derive any *Weight* or the least *Degree of Force* from the Possession of the *Imperial Dignity*: Because it is so glaring an Absurdity, that no Child in modern History but knows the contrary. I am ashamed to dwell upon it. You have soar'd so high in Politicks that you forget the fundamental Principles of Treaties, the first Elements of the *European System*. Read over the Negotiations that preceded the last great War; cast your Eye on any Introduction *ad Jus publicum Germaniæ*; even *Isaac Lebeup* knows the *Weight* of an Emperor: Do not therefore from the Height of your Presumption despise every *English* Reader, for whose supposed Ignorance alone this idle Doctrine can be calculated. But in Order to decide this Question, let the Public

lic know (if *England* be yet happy enough to be ignorant of it) whether the *Hanoverian* Solicitations were carried on at *Vienna*, as it was the *Archducal* or the *Imperial* Court. The Vote of *Hanover* was given in Favour of the present Emperor for other Reasons, in which the Interest of *Great-Britain* was probably as much considered as it has been in some other Transactions; but your Vindication of that Vote comes too late, and however fly, is very ineffectual.

You conclude your Letter with some Observations that deserve Notice. Your Description of *English* Liberty is rendered curious, by your ushering it in with Pomp, and telling us, that no People ever were so free as the *English*. For the *English* are free, you say, to employ their Talents in any honest Way to acquire their Fortune*. Surprising! People were not so free in *Greece* or *Rome*; People are not so free now even in *Russia*; in *Russia*, to be sure, *ex quovis ligno fit Mercurius*. Again, an *Englishman* who has acquired

*a Fortune, may employ it and even dispose of it as he pleases : Strange ! a singular Instance of English Liberty truly ! A Frenchman can boast no such glorious Privilege, or our Author knows it not. But, beside all this, an Englishman's Fortune intitles him (unless some Objection prevents it) to the supreme Dignity of representing his Country in Parliament, and speaking his Sentiments in a Language as free as (a Majority or a Speaker will let him utter) his Thoughts. Most prodigious ! Blush, O ye ancient, blush, O ye modern, Republics ; hide your diminished Heads, Athens, and Rome, Venice, Holland, and Swisserland. Thus is English Liberty described: Here every Minister is free. Here is no Dictator *Papirius*, to follow his guilty Servant to his Trial, and drag him from behind the Screen of a factious Senate into Judgment ; no Discipline to prevail, no Authority to gain the Victory over partial Faction. All enjoy Liberty, here is *Royal Liberty, Ministerial Liberty*, and every Man
may*

may — spend the Money he has earned, to gain a Seat in P——t. I hope however you had no particular Design in this Definition of *English* Liberty; you have confined it for no private Purpose. You do not imagine that though you omit to mention, *Englishmen* will forget, that they have a Right to a *Habeas Corpus*, that it is their Privilege to be tried by a Grand Jury in the first Instance, whenever they are accused; and that they are as yet possessed of the invaluable *Liberty of the Press*, which you have so freely used in your Letter, though you have not mentioned it in your Definition.

After your full and wonderful Description of *English* Liberty, you give us your Thought on a very important Subject indeed, the *Commerce of England*. I am only sorry you treat it so superficially. I shall not enter into the Consideration of what you say concerning *France*; no Man can be more desirous of abridging it's Power than I am, and for that Reason it is I object to the Measures you appear to pursue,

sue, as they must contribute to confirm and encrease that Power which must always be dangerous to *England*.

Your Argument (and you glory much in it) *that a Prince who extends his Care beyond his own* (I suppose you mean *British*) *Dominions, must be most dependent on his People*, will, I dare say, impose on nobody; the present exorbitant *Civil List* has taught us all what to think of the Profusion of former Kings. And while the heavy Load of the National Debt is so sensibly felt, we need not be put in Mind that the Expence of our Kings now, is made at the Charge of the Nation; and that the same Profusion that formerly reduced them to depend on the People, may too soon bring the Nation in it's turn to depend upon them.

Your Comparison of a Prince engaged in the Disputes upon the Continent, with *Charles II.* and *James II.* who were certainly not in the Interest of the *English* Nation, proves nothing; since a Prince, or rather a Ministry,

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may from a foreign Interest be as little in the *English* National Interest, as either of these two ill advised Brothers; and should that ever be the Case, the Consequence will be in this Respect worse, that it will drain the Country of that Wealth, which (it must be owned) they left in it. I will add, that they left it, only perhaps because Parliaments refused to give it them. A wise Lesson by the Way for Parliaments to remember.

I cannot guess why you draw that Veil, which I think very proper for your Negotiations, over every Branch of our Commerce beside the *Portugal* Trade, and some *new Russian Project* which has hitherto added little to our National Stock. That our Trade to *Portugal* increased very considerably after Mr. *Metbuen's* advantageous Treaty, can create no Wonder in any Man the least acquainted with Trade; and has as little Relation to a War with *France*, as the Decay of that Trade will have to a Peace with *France*, should it arrive in such a Conjunction. I have observed great Stress laid in this
Letter

Letter on our Success in *Russia*; I wish the Scheme touched on here, may ever recover that Trade from the Situation it has been in for some Years; and I wish some Regard were obtained for our Trade too in *Sweden*, in the present Circumstances of that Nation. But with Respect to *Russia* we are told, among other glorious Feats of the present, or perhaps of the late, Administration, that *France* was kept from gaining an Ascendant in *Russia*, which was *the only Thing wanting to the Accomplishment of her Projects* *. And this Hair-breadth Escape was atchieved by *the wise Representations of the British Minister*. Now although I am the last Man in *England*, who would dispute the Wisdom of any *British Minister* that ever was, or now is, at *Petersburgh*, and it would be impertinent in this Case, where we are not informed, who is the Minister endowed with the Faculty of making such *wise Representations*; yet I hope I may be permitted to question a little the Wisdom of *France*. What could they

* P. 13.

propose

propose to themselves by gaining *Russia*, more than one Circumstance or other has actually procured for them? A Veil of Secrecy yet covers any Thing that Court has done to affect our *Western* System: And surely *France* did not expect any Succours from thence; if she did she must have expected an *English* Fleet to carry and to convoy them, as we convoyed the *Spaniards* into *Italy*. No, but she expected to become the Mediator of a Peace between *Russia* and *Sweden*, and it is notorious we have supplanted her in that ambitious and important View; and thereby frustrated all her fine-spun Schemes in the North! Important Effects, of wise Representations!

To return to the Commerce of *England*, and to it's *Manufactures*, which though omitted in the Letter are the Materials of that Commerce. As Commerce is confessed to be the Source of our Riches, which once dry'd up or exhausted, we shall become little more considerable than the State of *Venice*, that sunk as Commerce left her Channel; I am surprised,

prised, the Letter Writer has not considered how far it is affected, by the Load of Debt under which the Nation groans, and which we are every Day increasing while we amuse ourselves with former Examples of Confederacies formed, Wars waged, and Victories obtained, before the Nation was reduced to it's present Condition. What must become of our Trade, if we make it our only Object to discover Funds that shall answer the Rate of Interest demanded by Lenders, and esteem the Repayment of the Principal, the Ease of the Nation, to be Considerations our great Grandchildren will come Time enough to examine? Is the diverting Millions from circulating in the Trade of *England*, to support *German* Woollen and Linen Manufacturies, a trifling, and frivolous Consequence? The heightning still the already too high, foreign demand upon our Cash, is no doubt an Encouragement to our Manufacturers, and to our Sailors. The first will fill our Armies, and the last will serve to man the Royal Navy.

And

And as to the Act of Navigation, though it be the Mother of the *English* Shipping, it may perhaps argue Singularity of Penetration to discover it's Absurdity. Yet these are the Essentials of *British* Commerce, and a Ministry which neglects these, will in vain employ all the Arts and Influence of Power to vindicate it's Conduct.

I beg Pardon for troubling you so long, although I have omitted many Things for the Sake of Brevity. A true *English* Zeal has excited me to say what I have said; if you think this Zeal has transported me too far, reflect how much farther a Motive not so good has transported you.

I am &c.

Bristol,
17 January, 1742-3.

L. W

